



Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: 
A New Consensus in Monetary Policy 
 
Philip Arestis
University of Cambridge, UK 
 
Alexander Mihailov 
University of Reading, UK 
 
 
Economic Analysis Research Group
 




www.reading.ac.uk/EARG Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: 
A New Consensus in Monetary Policy 
 
 








This paper demonstrates that recent influential contributions to monetary policy imply 
an emerging consensus whereby neither rigid rules nor complete discretion are found 
optimal. Instead, middle-ground monetary regimes based on rules (operative under 
‘normal’ circumstances) to anchor inflation expectations over the long run, but designed 
with enough flexibility to mitigate the short-run effect of shocks (with communicated 
discretion in ‘exceptional’ circumstances temporarily overriding these rules), are 
gaining support in theoretical models and policy formulation and implementation. The 
opposition of ‘rules versus discretion’ has, thus, reappeared as the synthesis of ‘rules 
cum discretion’, in essence as inflation-forecast targeting. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on optimal monetary policy has made a tremendous leap ahead over the 
last fifteen years, and more definitely since the beginning of the new millennium. In 
doing so, it has incorporated recent important theoretical advances along with richer 
empirical and applied sophistication. The analysis of optimal policy in aggregative but 
microfounded dynamic-stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) models or various 
game-theoretic and mechanism-design set-ups has now begun to allow for deeper 
heterogeneity, information imperfections, incomplete markets, bounded rationality and 
other realistic intricacies. The microfoundations of macroeconomic behavior have 
provided an appropriate metric for utility and, through some form of aggregation (still 
debatable), welfare and, hence, a solid basis for policy analysis ‘derived’ from ‘first 
principles’. Progressively adding complexity, usually handled through numerical 
methods, has enhanced the realism of the new generation of economic and financial 
models without exposing them to the Lucas (1976) critique. It is from the latter critique 
that the ambitious but ad-hoc large-scale macroeconometric models of the early 1970s 
suffered. Both the logical coherence imposed by microfounded theories and the 
increased real-world relevance of these DSGE models have made them more credible, if 
not completely legitimate (due to inevitable simplifying assumptions). The summarized 
developments have resulted in what Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) labeled as “the 
science of monetary policy”. 
Such profound changes in the way researchers and practitioners of economic policy 
formalize, measure and simulate economic realities and, therefore, in their advice to 
policymakers warrant a reexamination of what we know at present about optimal 
monetary policy. This issue is quite old, actually going back at least to Fisher (1896), Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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and Wicksell (1898). In the present study we attempt to organize and assess the 
available arguments and evidence in the most recent theoretical and empirical literature 
as well as central bank policy practice. In doing so, we suggest that an obvious 
convergence of opinion to the inflation-forecast targeting (IFT) framework as optimal 
monetary policy has taken place, at least given the current global economic 
circumstances. By ‘most recent’, we mean a relatively rich selection of influential 
contributions that have been published after the turn of the millennium, and more 
precisely following the treatise by Woodford (2003).
1 This type of work is not intended 
to, and cannot, be complete. Yet it is ‘essentially exhaustive’, in the sense of concisely 
presenting within the perspective of seminal earlier research the key novel ideas or 
problems (with possible solutions, where proposed or implemented) in terms of theory 
and practice of optimal monetary policy and the related degree of central bank 
independence. 
Academic interest in monetary policy has been reignited, especially after the New 
Keynesian (Monetary) Policy Model was able to justify a role for monetary policy that 
is stronger than the limited (and not systematic, hence, undesirable) effects of money 
surprises in the neoclassical flexible-price representative-agent  rational-expectations 
framework of Sargent and Wallace (1975, 1981), Kydland and Prescott (1977), and 
Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b). It is noteworthy that many leading journals have 
highlighted new advances in monetary economics topics in special issues very recently, 
that is, post the Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003) systematization of the New 
Keynesian or Neo-Wicksellian theory of modern monetary policy. Our selective, yet 
quite representative, analysis also draws on a few such authoritative discussions. 
 
1 In fact, the first coherent microfounded theory of monetary policy. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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In a preview, we here essentially argue that IFT appears to have alleviated the long-
lasting tension in policy making between rules versus discretion as well as the related 
debate on the appropriate degree of autonomy of the monetary authority. We bring 
together our pieces of evidence from the existing huge theoretical and empirical 
literature and structure them along two complementary dimensions, one focusing on 
institution design and another on monetary policy optimality under nominal rigidity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the fundamental characteristics of 
the optimal policy problem and its implications for central bank independence in the 
earlier neoclassical literature. Section 3 revisits the same topic from the perspective of 
the more recent New Keynesian contributions. Both these sections ultimately introduce 
inflation targeting as resolving, from a different angle in each, the highlighted trade-
offs. Finally, section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
2. The Optimal Policy Problem in Early Seminal Work 
Optimal monetary policy can be defined only with respect to a particular model of the 
economic environment and the economic agents interacting within it. More precisely, 
one could talk about optimal monetary policy only within the context of a particular 
optimization problem for the monetary authority. This optimization problem is 
constrained by the posited or inferred (‘revealed’) preferences, available technologies, 
assumed distributions for the stochastic processes and other ‘first principles’ in 
axiomatic microfounded macromodels. In the past, the objective function was specified 
on an ad-hoc basis: either as maximizing social welfare (‘measured’ by an explicit 
aggregate utility function)  or, due to the duality of the problem known from 
mathematical economics, as minimizing social loss, again ‘identified’ explicitly by an 
aggregate loss function. Woodford (2003, chapter 6) has shown how the loss function Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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could, in fact, be derived from first principles, that is, as a quadratic approximation to 
the assumed utility function which the representative agent maximizes. With no formal 
model of the economy, centered around a fully-articulated (dynamic-stochastic) optimal 
control problem to be ‘solved’ by a (not necessarily benevolent) monetary authority, 
with given (microfounded) economic environment and (enforceable) institutional 
framework, clearly, no optimality of policy can be established. For this reason, it is 
difficult to interpret a given monetary policy, derived to be optimal in a particular 
economic set-up, as the unique and universal optimal monetary policy for all 
circumstances. Naturally, alternative optimal policies will be the outcomes of 
alternative models, and any optimal policy, because it has to be derived from an explicit 
optimization problem, will be sensitive to the functional forms of the objective 
function(s) as well as to the specified constraint(s), the underlying choice of parameter 
values and other assumptions. It is not surprising, therefore, that a variety of optimal 
policies exist in the literature as outcomes of differently formalized aggregate 
optimization problems solved by economic agents and public authorities. That is why so 
many debates and doubts have been associated with the question of what monetary 
policy is, after all, optimal. 
Nevertheless, more and more common ground has been gained on the major aspects of 
what monetary policy can and should do. Woodford (2003) has notably argued that the 
optimal monetary policy consists in precommitment from a ‘timeless’ perspective.
2 
Woodford’s (op. cit.) theoretical results have often been interpreted to correspond 
closely in practice to the strategies of inflation targeting, recently adopted by a number 
of central banks around the world. The purpose of the present study is precisely to take 
 
2 For a formal and precise definition, see Woodford, 2003, pp. 538-539 and 542-543; on a more intuitive 
level, this is roughly a time-invariant optimal policy rule ensuring unique bounded equilibrium. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
  7
stock of this approach and on the related core economic advice concerning policy 
optimality and effectiveness. The converging views are on a subset of monetary policy 
issues, theoretical models, empirical techniques or implementation frameworks. To 
provide a background, we present and assess them next as embedded in the context of 
earlier seminal work. 
Writing from the standpoint of the modern Neo-Wicksellian theory of monetary policy, 
Woodford (2006) identifies two ‘antithetic’ roles that have traditionally been assigned 
to monetary policy: (i) to provide a monetary standard, that is, a stable value of the 
national currency over a long run; and (ii) to engage in stabilization policy that 
facilitates adjustment of the economy following larger shocks. Woodford (2006) further 
explains how the tension between these two, often conflicting, objectives has produced 
vigorous policy debates and, very likely, the bleak performance of industrialized 
economies in the 1970s and the 1980s. The tension is, in fact, well known in the long 
literature on ‘rules versus discretion’ in policymaking. But it seems to have been 
recently reconciled, as we would argue here, by the theory and practice of inflation 
targeting, also described as ‘flexible rules’ by Woodford (2003) or ‘constrained 
discretion’ by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997); or, in a broader sense, by any forecast-
based monetary policy. Woodford (2006) qualifies IFT as the monetary standard of the 
21
st century, due to a number of perceived advantages of this framework to some of 
which we briefly return later on. 
Analysis on how monetary policy should be conducted evolved historically out of the 
necessity of practice. As a result, policymakers have created alternative frameworks to 
formulate and implement monetary policy. Their benefits and costs have been, at the 
same time, an issue for academic debates, often based on theoretical premises. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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Tinbergen (1952) seems to be the first authoritative treatment of a theory of economic 
policy, and Theil (1961, 1964) considerably extended that work. With the advance of 
the methods of (deterministic) dynamic programming by Bellman (1957) and followers, 
and of (deterministic) optimal control by Pontryagin et al. (1962), economists have 
found new, and better-suited, formal tools to address many old and unsolved policy 
problems. Muth’s (1961) rational expectations formulation also contributed to the 
methodological rethinking and enrichment of earlier economic models and econometric 
approaches. It has taken, though, about a decade for these new concepts and 
methodologies to gain a firm grounding across the profession. Yet following work by 
Lucas (1972, 1976) and Sargent and Wallace (1975), applications of rational-
expectations models to optimal policy problems in dynamic-stochastic partial or general 
equilibrium environments have generated a huge literature with many important results. 
2.1 Early Contributions: Targets, Instruments and Uncertainty 
Brainard (1967) is a classic exposition of a simple optimization problem that a 
policymaker has to solve under uncertainty of two types: (i) the impact of the realization 
of a shock on a single-variable target, i.e. shock (or additive) uncertainty; and (ii) the 
response parameter in the policy feedback model, i.e. parameter (or multiplicative) 
uncertainty. Two other types of uncertainty widely employed at present are: (iii) model 
uncertainty, when the researcher has more than one model of the economy and is not 
certain which one of them is the ‘true’ model; and (iv) Knightean uncertainty (Knight, 
1921), synonymously referred to as ambiguity, when the researcher is not able to assign 
even subjective probabilities to all possible stochastic events, so that s/he does not know 
(completely) the set of possible outcomes of one or more shock processes. The earlier 
literature concerning decisions under uncertainty of type (i) above, i.e. such that has Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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nothing to do with the actions of the policymaker, had commonly prescribed ‘certainty-
equivalence behavior’; and to quote Brainard (1967), “the policy maker should act on 
the basis of expected values as if he were certain they would actually occur” (p. 413). 
However, the optimal policy would look very different when there is also uncertainty of 
other types. Brainard (op. cit.) illustrates this point lucidly in a very ‘bare’ set-up with 
one target and one instrument. His one-target one-instrument model condenses in a 
‘nutshell’ the simplest procedure defining optimal policy under what is now called 
parameter uncertainty. In such a case, higher moments of the distribution of the target 
variable, not just its mean, would be affected. Subsequent literature progressively 
introduced into the modeling of monetary policy the realistic assumptions of model 
uncertainty (type iii as above) and ambiguity (type iv as above), up until the currently 
fashionable targeting regimes and robust optimal control.
3 
In a widely cited paper, Poole (1970) extended Brainard’s (1967) work by complicating 
its ‘structure’ equation representing the economy in terms of the Hicks (1937) IS-LM 
model. Moreover, Poole (1970) claimed to have solved the so-called ‘target problem’ 
(or, synonymously, ‘instrument problem’) in the earlier literature. The problem arises 
under uncertainty because the monetary authority may operate through either interest 
rate changes or money stock changes, but not through both independently. Poole (1970) 
has shown that each of two alternative monetary policies, one operating through the 
interest rate
4 and another through the money stock,
5 can be superior to the other, 
depending on parameter constellations. Poole (op. cit.) also argued in favor of a 
 
3 Note that in modern optimal control terminology what is termed here the instrument(s) is synonymous 
with the control (or choice, or decision) variable(s) in a policy optimization problem, upon which the 
decision maker acts directly to affect the target(s), or the state variable(s). 
4 And, thus, similar to an interest-rate rule, but not necessarily the same since the instrument may be 
adjusted under discretion. 
5 Thus similar to, but not necessarily the same as, a money-supply rule. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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‘combination policy’, whereby the interest rate and the money stock are maintained in 
certain relationship depending, again, on the chosen parameters (i.e. a result analogous 
to the ‘policy portfolio’ in the extended model of Brainard, 1967, involving two 
instruments and one target). Poole (1970) concludes that such policy is as good as, or 
superior to, either interest rate or money stock policies, i.e. it is an optimal policy; 
however, “the success of the combination policy depends on knowledge of the 
parameters of the model, and the combination policy depends on knowledge of more 
parameters than does a pure money stock or pure interest rate policy” (p. 209). It 
follows that for practical purposes this analysis is difficult to exploit in a real-world 
situation. 
Sargent and Wallace (1975) pursue further the analysis of Brainard (1967) and Poole 
(1970). They introduce rational expectations in the analytical framework, but sacrifice 
uncertainty, and work out alternative monetary policies in an ad-hoc macromodel 
centered around ‘surprise inflation’ and popular at the time. Recalling that in some of 
this earlier literature the problem of optimal policy was equivalently termed 
stabilization policy, we summarize their two main results: (i) indeterminacy of the 
equilibrium price level arises under an interest-rate instrument;
6 and (ii) with a 
deterministic money-supply rule instead, any growth rate, hence, “an X percent growth” 
rule, is optimal in their model. 
2.2 More Recent Contributions: Rules, Discretion and Central Bank Independence 
A principal dimension in the enrichment of the monetary policy literature by game-
theoretic and incentive-contract approaches based on rational expectations since the 
mid-1970s relates to the problem of time inconsistency and to the implied degree of 
 
6 This result has been refined and, essentially, refuted by Woodford (1995). Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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central bank independence. The debate on rules versus discretion is a defining attribute 
of optimal policy and institution design, and for that reason our focus shifts next to a 
summary of its main reversals. Table 1 proposes a chronology of this debate along with 
a brief outline of its key results. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Much work on optimal monetary policy extends Kydland and Prescott (1977), who 
established the dominance of rules over discretion because of the ‘time-inconsistency’ 
problem. Calvo (1978) pointed out that such dynamic inconsistency arises due to the ex-
post incentives for a government to use ‘surprise inflation’ to reduce the real value of 
any outstanding fiat money. Barro and Gordon (1983a) termed this ‘inflationary bias’ 
under discretion; potentially, also under the influence of interfering politicians, i.e. the 
political business cycle. With repeated interaction, Barro and Gordon (1983b) proposed 
the build-up of reputation and, hence, credibility as one solution to the inflationary bias. 
Taylor (1983) argued in favor of rules when private information about the state of the 
economy was absent, but Lucas and Stokey (1983) found that under a debt rule the 
Ramsey (1927) policy is inconsistent. Canzoneri (1985), in turn, showed discretion to 
be optimal when the central bank can exploit private information, while Rogoff (1985) 
proposed the appointment of a central banker with ‘conservative’ preferences relative to 
the median voter as another solution to the inflationary bias under discretion. In an 
empirical paper, Goodfriend (1986) supported discretion complemented by ‘monetary 
mystique’, and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) agreed on theoretical grounds that 
secrecy is essential if there exists private information regarding policy shifts. 
The rules versus discretion debate continued throughout the 1990s, incorporating new 
aspects and moving into the direction of central bank independence and optimal Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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institution design. As a consequence, other, essentially institutional solutions to the 
inflationary bias were further on suggested in the literature. The most prominent ones 
include Lohmann’s (1992) conservative central banking institution with an override 
clause kept for the government to enact under extreme shocks, shown to be better than 
either rules or discretion, Walsh’s (1995) contract-theory approach to appointing central 
bankers, and the still broader institution-design perspective launched perhaps by 
Lohmann (1992) but evolving into targeting rules as a particular modern type of a 
monetary regime. Ironically, such inflation(-forecast) targeting frameworks were 
adopted in the early 1990s by pragmatic government officials in New Zealand, Canada, 
Chile, Israel, the UK, Sweden, Australia, Finland and Spain even before theoretical 
justification for them was convincingly demonstrated. 
The above theoretical arguments implied more central bank independence and were 
largely supported by parallel empirical literature
7. However, there were also theoretical 
and empirical claims against too much central bank independence: (i) leaving the 
central bank unaccountable is not democratic; (ii) the credibility problem of central 
banks may either not really exist, being merely a theoretical artifact, or, conversely, 
extend as well to consolidated government entities;
8 (iii) an autonomous monetary 
authority may totally ignore output and employment fluctuations, slipping into a 
‘deflationary bias’, which disrupts the financial system and economic activity. 
 
7 Beginning with Parkin and Bade (1978), Alesina (1988), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), 
Cukierman (1992), and Alesina and Summers (1993), to mention only the earliest studies. 
8 See, for example, McCallum (1997), who argues that: (i) it is inappropriate to presume that central 
banks will, in the absence of any tangible precommitment technology, inevitably behave in a 
‘discretionary’ fashion that implies an inflationary bias, and sees no necessary trade-off between 
‘flexibility and commitment’; (ii) to the extent that the absence of any precommitment technology is 
nevertheless a problem, it will apply to a consolidated central bank-plus-government entity as well, and 
thus contracts between governments and central banks, e.g. of the type suggested by Walsh (1995), do not 
overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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Interestingly, Fischer (1994) and Debelle and Fischer (1994) argued that instrument 
independence coupled with goal dependence was the socially optimal institutional 
arrangement to formulate and implement monetary policy in a democratic society. 
Svensson (1997a) and Herrendorf (1998) specified it as an inflation targeting 
framework,
9 whereby the government delegates the reference interest rate setting to the 
central bank (or a monetary policy committee), but retains the quantification of the 
numerical inflation goal for itself. This type of monetary regime was labeled by 
Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) as constrained discretion, again in an inflation-targeting 
context. Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002) further emphasized that such a democratic 
approach to monetary policy would require augmented responsibility of the central bank 
for its actions as well as accountability to the government and/or the parliament. The 
transparency of actual policymaking was considered a major dimension of 
accountability, with a potential to solve the private information problem when central 
bank discretion was found optimal. 
2.3 Pragmatic Approaches: Inflation Targeting as Solution to Rules vs. Discretion 
It is fair to note that the (macro)economics profession during the 1970s and the 1980s, 
after the 1960s breakdown of the neoclassical synthesis, was left “in a state of 
schizophrenia where most practitioners continue to resort to the neoclassical synthesis 
for forecasting and policy analysis while researchers have almost totally discarded it as 
a framework for conducting research” (Danthine, 1997, p. 135; see also Mankiw’s, 
1990, ‘quick refresher course’). Hence, monetary policy advice too was for a long 
period in disorder and dispute, even until very recently when Woodford (2003) 
 
9 Haldane, ed. (1995), Leiderman and Svensson, eds. (1995), Svensson (1997b), Bernanke and Mishkin 
(1997), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Vickers (1998), and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen 
(1999) constitute the earliest other work that concentrates explicitly on inflation targets. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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ultimately was able to propose coherent theoretical foundations for it. Economic 
pragmatism, then, was called upon to help in policy circles under the pressing needs of 
real-world problems, mostly related to reorganizing the functioning and the 
management of the economy in a more efficient way. That is how the pragmatic 
approach to inflation targeting emerged, somewhat spontaneously, in the early 1990s, to 
be theoretically justified only with a certain lag, essentially in the context of the New 
Keynesian policy model or, perhaps better, the Neo-Wicksellian treatise of Woodford 
(2003). 
Indeed, the desire for a considerable improvement in the steering of the macroeconomy 
by the government produced the inflation-targeting framework in New Zealand.
10 Neo-
Wicksellian theorizing then proclaimed, with a delay of roughly a decade, that the 
flexible variant of inflation targeting, i.e. when the central bank responds to an output 
gap measure in addition to the inflation gap relative to the inflation target, is the optimal 
monetary policy. Optimality was, of course, proven within explicit and relatively rich 
economic models of the New Keynesian or Neo-Wicksellian kind. Yet in a plainer 
language, accessible to the wide public, it basically implied that targeting regimes were 
preferable mostly because they made the best use of all available relevant information. 
Forecast-based targeting also allows for judgment to ‘adjust’ the conclusions from a 
number of alternative models central bankers use in decision making. Svensson (1997a, 
1997b), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke and Woodford (1997) were among 
the first academics to embrace, theoretically justify, and popularize this new fashion in 
central banking. 
 
10 The first explicit IFT strategy was introduced in New Zealand by law adopted in 1989, and has been 
successfully implemented there since then (see, for instance, Archer, 1997). Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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The present section has, thus, argued that the IFT policy framework could be seen as an 
institutional solution to the ‘rules versus discretion’ debate, essentially converging to a 
middle ground of formulating and implementing ‘flexible rules cum constrained 
discretion’ under instrument independence with goal dependence. But this institution-
design optimality of inflation targeting is just one of the attractive features of this 
monetary strategy. Another important dimension that makes IFT desirable from the 
viewpoint of economic theory is its justification as optimal monetary policy under 
nominal rigidities. This latter dimension is outlined in more detail in the next section. 
3. The Optimal Policy Problem in Recent New Keynesian Models 
The so-called New Keynesian (Monetary) Policy Model (NK(M)PM), also termed New 
Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS), after Goodfriend and King (1997), or Neo-Wicksellian 
model, after Woodford (2003), appears to be currently the mainstream paradigm in both 
the theory and practice of central banking. The NK/NNS/Neo-Wicksellian paradigm is 
exposed in sophisticated detail in Walsh (2003, chapters 8, 9, 10 and 11) and throughout 
the treatise of Woodford (2003). We summarize these approaches and their latest 
extensions in what follows. 
3.1 Theoretical Findings: Price-Level Stabilization Optimal 
An earlier important contribution within the NNS framework was King and Wolman 
(1999), who posed the question “What should the monetary authority do when prices 
are sticky?”, and gave the simple answer: “Stabilize the price level”. This question and 
this answer state concisely the key theoretical results and the corresponding policy 
recommendations of that research. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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A next theoretical question that logically follows, “What measures of inflation should 
central banks target?”, was asked and tentatively answered by Mankiw and Reis (2003). 
Based on a calibration of US data, they found that an inflation targeting central bank 
“that wants to achieve maximum stability of economic activity should use a price index 
that gives a substantial weight to the level of nominal wages” (p. 1058). 
In an ambitious study along the same NNS paradigm, but which attempts to synthesize 
as well previous main findings in the field, Khan, King and Wolman (2003) distinguish 
three intellectual traditions that are relevant to the analysis of optimal monetary policy. 
To each of these traditions, they assign a policy prescription as to the appropriate 
regulation of the nominal interest rate by the monetary authority: 
(1) arguing that the business cycle was caused by swings in the dollar, the 
Fisherian prescription (Fisher, 1896, 1911, 1923, 1930) calls for stabilization of the 
price level, and implies that the nominal interest rate would, therefore, fluctuate with 
variations in real activity; 
(2) focusing on the inefficient output level generated in the short run by market 
forces under rigid wages and prices, the Keynesian prescription (Keynes, 1936) calls for 
stabilization of real economic activity by fiscal and monetary authorities, implying 
substantial variation in the nominal interest rate when shocks (to aggregate demand) hit 
the economy; 
(3) analyzing monetary policy through a long-run perspective whereby prices 
are fully flexible and applying the microeconomic principle of policy analysis according 
to which social and private cost should be equated, the Friedman prescription 
(Friedman, 1969) consists in what became known as Friedman’s rule, i.e. that the 
nominal interest rate should be approximately zero, implying deflation on average. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
  17
                                                
Following the approach of Ramsey (1927) and Lucas and Stokey (1983), Khan, King 
and Wolman (2003) then assume full commitment under a benevolent social planner 
and sticky prices as in Calvo (1983). They find support for the Friedman prescription of 
deflation, but with a low positive nominal interest rate, because of the price rigidity in 
their model; as well as for the Fisherian prescription interpreted by them as eliminating 
price-level surprises, but again with some tendency for interest rate smoothing because 
of the pricing friction. However, they do not find much support for the Keynesian 
prescription to stabilize real activity. Similarly to the earlier paper by King and Wolman 
(1999) and within the same broad context of the NNS model, they conclude that optimal 
monetary policy when prices are sticky reduces to stabilizing the price level, i.e. 
imitating (or replicating), in a sense, the allocations that would emerge under fully 
flexible prices. This is, in essence, the conclusion on monetary policy optimality that is 
reproduced in most New Keynesian models with nominal rigidities. 
3.2 Empirical Evidence: Estimated Monetary Policy Reaction Functions 
The NK/NNS theory summarized in the preceding subsection provides a rationale for, 
and is complemented by, empirical estimation, tests and applications. A huge number of 
papers have explored such applied avenues.
11 
Just a single equation, out of the three- or four-equation system commonly appearing in 
various versions of the NKPM, has often been estimated in econometric work. Two 
equations have usually been preferred for such separate estimation as a single equation, 
and in different specifications. These are the forward-looking (NK) Phillips curve, 
 
11 Two review issues on this empirical literature are worth mentioning. One is in the Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics (see Henry and Pagan, 2004, for an introduction), entitled ‘The Econometrics of 
the NKPM’. The second is in the Journal of Monetary Economics (see King and Plosser, 2005) under the 
theme ‘The Econometrics of the New Keynesian Price Equation’ – the titles are quite indicative. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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which plays in the model also the role of an aggregate supply (AS) schedule, and the 
Taylor (1993) rule, which is the monetary policy reaction function in the NKPM. 
Taylor-type rule estimation has been perhaps the most exploited empirical approach in 
applied monetary policy in the last decade or so. The reason is that the original rule is 
simple, intuitive and provides a good proxy and a relatively objective measure of the 
actual policy stance of real-world central banks. However, more recently this equation 
has been criticized on a number of accounts. At the worst extreme, it has been called 
‘spurious regression’ (Österholm, 2005). At the best extreme, it has been found 
‘suboptimal’ (e.g. in Woodford, 2001, 2003) in more sophisticated NK/NNS models, 
i.e. inferior to what has been termed a targeting rule by Svensson (1999, 2003), a 
targeting regime by Walsh (2003), or still forecast targeting by Svensson (2006). The 
best-known example of a targeting regime in actual policy making is the IFT framework 
for monetary policy formulation and implementation, now adopted in more than 20 
countries. 
3.3 Policy Advice: Optimal Inflation Targets plus Central Bank Judgment 
This leads us naturally to the implications of the NK(M)PM for practical central 
banking. Neo-Wicksellian theory (for example, Woodford, 2003) and the econometrics 
behind the NK/NNS model augmented with an optimizing central bank assigned an 
inflation target but also to lower the variance of the output gap and of the change in the 
interest rate (for example, Söderstöm et al., 2005) have combined to, in essence, support 
intellectually and empirically the popular inflation-targeting regimes. Moreover, 
NK/NNS/Neo-Wicksellian theory has recently shown that flexible inflation targeting, 
potentially incorporating central bank judgment and model uncertainty, and, perhaps, 
being more transparent and explicit about operational objectives, forecasts and Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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communication  is the optimal monetary policy in relatively rich and realistic 
microfounded economic environments  (Svensson, 2005; Svensson and Woodford, 
2005; and Woodford, 2006). On the empirical side, the high informational and 
computational requirements involved in the perpetual re-estimation, re-forecasting, re-
optimizing and re-communication inherent in targeting regimes has imposed the need 
for solid econometric work at central banks. Many academics and policy makers now 
argue that flexible inflation targeting seems to be the best practice in central banking, in 
addition to having been found the optimal monetary strategy (see, for instance, 
Svensson, 2006; Woodford, 2006)
12. 
Inflation is, of course, not the sole objective of monetary policy; nor is the natural rate 
doctrine, underlying the NNS paradigm, the only possible one. Yet some form of an 
implicit, if not explicit, inflation target appears to be the dominant long-term, or still 
benchmark (baseline), goal in both (mainstream) theory and policy making at present. 
The central bank would follow it until an extreme or exceptional ‘shock’ emerges or a 
huge ‘risk’ threatens to materialize, sometimes qualified as ‘exotic event’, which is 
“both unforeseeable and unquantifiable” (Athey et al., 2005, p. 1462). In such ‘non-
standard’ situations (i.e. out of the ‘baseline’ scenario) the central bank would, 
logically, react in a discretionary manner, even under no explicit IFT strategy but still 
under what Bernanke (2004) qualifies as forecast-based monetary policy as in the US.
13 
Meanwhile, along with the primary long-term objective of low inflation, conducive also 
to long-run growth (via anchored inflation expectations and, hence, low real interest rate 
 
12 Arestis and Sawyer (2003, 2004), among others, are sceptical about the success of inflation targeting 
and the underlying model which they label the ‘new consensus’ in monetary economics and suggest that 
it is rather limited in its analysis. They claim, furthermore, that when the analysis is broadened out to 
embrace empirical issues and evidence, monetary policy is relatively impotent. They also argue that, by 
contrast, fiscal policy remains a powerful tool for macroeconomic policy, which they find particularly apt 
under the current economic conditions. 
13 Recent examples of such behavior of the monetary authority are the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, and the 
terrorist attack on the US in September 2001. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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variability), the central bank would do as much as it can to keep the economy going and 
to maintain financial stability. When one adds transparency and accountability in 
communicating the target and the policy measures to achieve it, we have the fully-
fledged inflation-targeting strategy. Current inflation-targeting central banks do not 
appear to completely ignore other objectives, despite the fact that they put the emphasis 
exclusively on inflation.
14 So it is rather a matter of interpretation, insofar as there is a 
difference of opinion between implicit and explicit strategies of central banks on what 
inflation targeting really means. It is clear that inflation targeting has both advantages 
and disadvantages relative to other monetary strategies, and Mishkin (2006a) is not 
silent about the disadvantages even in his introductory textbook. Moreover, the 
success/failure of inflation targeting may also be country-specific: it may work (better) 
in developed economies and not (that much) in developing/transition ones.
15 
Yet at present, theoretical results appear to predominantly support IFT practices; this is 
summarized by Athey et al. (2005): 
“One interpretation of our work is that we solve for the optimal inflation targets. As such, our 
work is related to the burgeoning literature on inflation targeting. (See the works of Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), and Faust and Svensson (2001), among 
many others.) In terms of the practical application of inflation targets, Bernanke and Mishkin 
(1997) discuss how inflation targets often take the form of ranges or limits on acceptable 
inflation rates similar to the ranges we derive. Indeed, our work here provides one theoretical 
rationale for the type of constrained discretion advocated by Bernanke and Mishkin” (p. 1433). 
 
14 See, for example, Mihailov (2006, 2007), who employs OLS, TSLS and GMM estimation of alternative 
policy reaction functions, to suggest that on empirical grounds such has been the case in the UK. 
15 This is a main worry in the literature overview by Arestis and Sawyer (2003) or the empirical study by 
Angeriz and Arestis (2006), among others. On the other hand, King (2005) has claimed that the 
introduction of IFT in the UK has resulted in greater stability of both real activity and inflation; and Vega 
and Winkelried (2005) present evidence from propensity score matching that IFT has helped in reducing 
the level and volatility of inflation in all countries that have adopted it. Similarly, employing a stochastic 
volatility model, Arestis et al. (2002) find that the adoption of inflation targets might have resulted in a 
more favourable monetary policy trade-off in most countries in their sample. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
  21
                                                
Inflation targeting has, moreover, largely incorporated, or has the potential to 
incorporate, most of the innovative approaches in optimal monetary policy analysis 
currently on the research agenda.
16 Looking back at the latest decade of our chronology 
of the ‘rules versus discretion’ debate in Table 1, one could see that the opposition is 
gradually moving toward a synthesis, embodied by the dominance of (various forms of) 
policy frameworks with well-designed rules and constrained discretion. Such are, in 
essence, the main conclusions and interpretations in Stokey (2003) and Woodford 
(2003). Faust and Svensson (2001) further claim that when goals are unobservable, 
transparency and credibility, typical for IFT regimes, are found optimal. Meyer (2002) 
agrees, from the practitioner’s point of view, in stating that rules and discretion with 
communication of policy to the public appear to be the best monetary policy practice. 
Bernanke and Woodford, eds. (2005) find flexible inflation targeting optimal and 
democratic; Svensson (2005) adds to this central bank judgment, readily allowed within 
IFT frameworks; and Svensson (2006), then, proclaims flexible IFT with judgment the 
best central bank practice. Moreover, Persson et al. (2006) are able to prove a result that 
has turned out to be tricky and evasive for long: they show consistency of the optimal 
Ramsey policy under a debt rule, thus updating the earlier work of Lucas and Stokey 
(1983) as well as of their own (Persson et al., 1987). Friedman (2006) remarks that the 
Greenspan period was one of discretion rather than of a rule, yet this also fits into an 
IFT framework in an implicit sense, as claimed by some observers of US monetary 
policy (Mishkin, 2006b, is perhaps the most authoritative author within this group). 
To conclude in terms of Table 1, we could sum-up or update this famous debate on 
optimal monetary policy and central bank independence as progressing from (rigid) 
rules  versus (full) discretion to (flexible) rules cum (constrained) discretion. While 
 
16 See, among others, Piger and Thornton, eds. (2004) or Bernanke and Woodford, eds. (2005). Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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section 2 has viewed the resolution of the debate by IFT mostly from an institution-
design perspective, section 3 has complemented our arguments by focusing on IFT’s 
optimality under nominal rigidity. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
The essential feature of inflation targeting, or in a broader sense of similar forecast 
targeting regimes, in our opinion is that it resolves the tension between the opposition of 
rules versus discretion, persistent in the literature since at least Kydland and Prescott 
(1977). Looking back at the theory and practice of monetary policy through a historical 
and analytical perspective, as we have done in this study, it seems as if we are heading 
to a sort of a core consensus whereby neither rigid rules nor complete discretion are 
considered, and found, as optimal anymore. Instead, middle-ground monetary regimes 
based on rules (fully operative under ‘normal’ circumstances) to anchor inflation 
expectations over the long run, but designed with enough flexibility to mitigate the 
short-run effect of unforeseeable shocks (with communicated and constrained discretion 
in such ‘exceptional’ circumstances temporarily overriding these rules), appear to be 
gaining more and more support in theoretical models (see, for example, Giannoni and 
Woodford, 2005; Athey et al., 2005; Svensson and Tetlow, 2005), and in policy 
formulation and implementation, with more than 20 countries having by now embarked 
on some form of inflation targeting.
17  
We would, more broadly, describe such regimes as monetary policy frameworks that 
fall into the general characterization of ‘flexible / long-run / baseline rules plus 
constrained / short-run / communicated discretion’. In other words, the past opposition 
 
17 An example of a more recent inflation targeter but one that has reached sophistication and perfection in 
managing and developing this monetary policy operating procedure is the Norges Bank, as praised in 
Svensson (2006). Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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of ‘rules versus discretion’ has at present almost consensually reappeared as the 
synthesis of ‘rules cum discretion’; or, more precisely, as ‘flexible rules cum 
constrained discretion’. In fact, this synthesis has emerged – within both institution-
design and sticky-price context – as the current dominant paradigm in the theoretical 
justification and practical implementation of optimal monetary policy and the implied 
degree of central bank independence. Arestis and Mihailov (October 2007), Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion 
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Table 1: A Chronology of the Debate on Rules vs. Discretion 
Paper  Main point introduced in the debate 
Kydland and Prescott (1977)  RULES rather than discretion due to TIME INCONSISTENCY 
Calvo (1978)  RULES, or else incentives for SURPRISE INFLATION 
Barro and Gordon (1983)  DISCRETION if REPUTATION solves INFLATIONARY BIAS 
Taylor (1983)  RULES if NO PRIVATE INFORMATION about state of economy 
Lucas and Stokey (1983)  INCONSISTENCY of Ramsey policy with DEBT RULE 
Rogoff (1985)  DISCRETION if CONSERVATIVE CENTRAL BANK preferences 
Canzoneri (1985)  DISCRETION if PRIVATE INFORMATION at central bank 
Goodfriend (1986)  DISCRETION with MONETARY MYSTIQUE: empirics 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)  DISCRETION if PRIVATE INFROMATION on policy shifts: SECRECY 
Lohmann (1992)  central banking INSTITUTION plus government OVERRIDE clause 
Debelle and Fischer (1994)  INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE with GOAL DEPENDENCE 
Walsh (1995)  DISCRETION with CONTRACT between government and central bank 
Bernanke and Mishkin (1997)  INFLATION TARGETING as CONSTRAINED DISCRETION 
Svensson (1997)  OPTIMAL INFLATION FORECASTS 
Faust and Svensson (2001)  TRANSPARENCY and CREDIBILITY if UNOBSERVABLE GOALS 
Meyer (2002)  rules AND discretion PLUS COMMUNICATION 
Stokey (2003)  reputation-building to DISCIPLINE discretion, WELL-DESIGNED rules 
Woodford (2003)  MICROfounded optimal policy: TIMELESS PRECOMMITMENT 
Bernanke and Woodford, eds. (2005)  FLEXIBLE inflation targeting OPTIMAL and DEMOCRATIC 
Svensson (2005)  flexible inflation targeting with central bank JUDGEMENT 
Athey – Atkeson – Kehoe (2005)  OPTIMAL DEGREE OF DISCRETION: inflation cap 
Svensson (2006)  flexible inflation targeting as BEST central bank PRACTICE 
Persson – Persson – Svensson (2006)  TIME CONSISTENCY with optimal Ramsey policy DEBT RULE 
Friedman (2006)  DISCRETION rather than rules UNDER GREENSPAN 
this paper (2007)  FLEXIBLE rules CUM CONSTRAINED discretion 
Note: More detailed explanatory comments are proposed in the main text. Full references of the works 
enumerated in the table are provided in the Bibliography section. 